Biden's 30,000 MW of Offshore Wind by 2030 is an Unattainable, Expensive Fantasy
Jonathan A. Lesser
Biden's RE folks have set a goal of 30,000 megawatts (MW) of offshore wind turbines by 2030  and 110,000 MW by 2050. 
They claim the 30,000-MW target would create thousands of new jobs and avoid 78 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions each year. 
By comparison, total US carbon dioxide emissions were about 5,000 million metric tons, in 2019, which means hundreds of $billions will be spent to achieve next to nothing regarding global warming.
The cost will be added to the $32 TRILLION federal debt. 
Regardless of whether these "30,000 MW by 2030" and "CO2 reduction" claims are accurate (they are not), this offshore wind target is yet another in a series of unworkable and unaffordable green fantasies that have been legislated in the energy-rich US and the energy-starved Europe.
As this report will demonstrate, the realities of offshore wind planning, development, and construction render the president’s goal physically unachievable. A single offshore wind project can take longer than a decade to develop.
Although numerous projects scheduled to be built before 2030 have been announced in the last decade (see Figure 1), only one—the 800-MW Vineyard Wind project, to be built off the Massachusetts coast south of Martha’s Vineyard—has begun construction. It may be commissioned at end 2023 or early 2024.
That project is facing at least three lawsuits, that will further delay completion. 
Even if the Biden's goal were physically achievable, it should not be pursued, because of offshore wind’s dismal economics, i.e., a wholesale price at least 10 c/kWh after huge federal and state subsidies, compared to about 5 c/kWh from existing fossil, hydro and nuclear plants. Offshore wind is hugely expensive, much more so than solar, onshore wind, hydro, and geothermal. 
The costs of installing offshore wind facilities will not be decreasing in future years. Economic and physical constraints are likely to increase the costs of offshore wind projects, as developers compete for scarce/expensive material and labor resources. 
Because wind speeds are random, 24/7/365, offshore wind would require significant investment in standby/backup power plants, primarily gas-fired power plants. Such plants need to be available, 24/7/365, staffed, fueled, and kept in good working order, to instantly counteract the regular ups and downs of wind output, and provide electricity when winds are weak, as happened in Europe in 2021, well before the Ukraine events.
Although wind and solar proponents claim, without proof, battery storage would eliminate the need for fossil-fuel backup generation, the costs, raw-materials, and manufacturing capacity needed to produce the required quantity of battery storage to provide just three or four hours of standby/backup power would be staggering.
See below section Capacity and Cost of Battery Systems for ONE HOUR and ONE MONTH StandbyBackup of US Electric System
See Soaring Costs Threaten Buildout of Biden's 30,000 MW by 2030 of Offshore Wind
Block Island Wind
There is only one offshore wind facility operating in the US—the 5-turbine, 30-MW Block Island Wind, BIW, located near Block Island, Rhode Island.
The project took two years to build at a cost of about $300 million, excluding onshore extension/augmentation of the grid, which was charged to New England ratepayers.
The 22-mile transmission line from BIW to the mainland had a cost $114 million. 
The overall project cost was over $400 million—more than $13,000/kW.
1) New, 60%-efficient, gas-fired, combined-cycle power plants have a capital cost of about $1,200/kW,
2) New offshore wind projects have an estimated capital cost of about $5,000/kW, including cabling from wind turbines to landfalls, but excluding onshore grid extension/augmentation, which is charged to ratepayers. 
3) New onshore wind projects in Maine had an estimated cost of about $2,600/kW in 2019, excluding grid extension/augmentation, which is charged to ratepayers. See page 41 of URL
Ever since BIW began producing electricity in December 2016, it has been plagued by operational issues, such as:
1) In 2017, both undersea cables that deliver electricity from the turbines became uncovered because of tidal action. After almost five years, the Sea-to-Shore cable still has not been reburied.
2) In June 2021, stress fractures were found in four of the five towers that support the turbines.
3) Although Ørsted, the project developer, shut down the turbines for “routine maintenance,” at least three of the five turbines were still off-line as of November 2021. 
Environmental Pushback, Logistics and Supply
Offshore wind development faces significant environmental pushback, including from commercial and sport fisheries interests.
As development accelerates, offshore wind projects will face growing logistical and supply issues.
Together, these will delay development and increase costs, completely offsetting the pipe-dream projections of decreasing costs.
The increasing goals of offshore wind of Europe and China, will worsen the logistical and supply issues faced by offshore wind developers in the United States.
Realities of Offshore Wind Project Development
The newest and largest offshore wind turbines are rated at about 14 MW
The 30,000 MW goal would require more than 2,200 such units during 2023 to 2030, or about 275/y.
Europe has never reached such a rate of installation!!
That implies installing 5.3 turbines every week for the next 8 years, 2023 through 2030, in addition to:
1) The undersea cables and onshore equipment, to deliver the electricity from wind turbines to the mainland
2) Expansion/augmentation of the high-voltage grid; the costs will be charged to ratepayers and taxpayers.
Developing a single offshore wind project, from concept, to completion of construction, to final testing and commissioning, can take a decade or longer.
After completing preliminary project plans, developers have to bid on, and secure offshore leases—large undersea plots of land where the at least 800-ft-tall wind turbines would be built.
Then, they must prepare detailed construction and operation plans (COPS), which must be approved by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), as part of an overall environmental review process.
BOEM has to produce a detailed environmental impact statement (EIS) for the project, and manage the inevitable legal challenges to the agency’s findings.
Developers must secure financing for their projects, which can take several years and requires detailed spreadsheet analyses, including 20-y projections of future revenues and costs, to prove the project's financial viability to financiers.
After environmental permits and financing are secured, and assuming that there is no subsequent litigation, can construction begin.
Based on experience in Europe, the construction phase for a typical 800 – 1,000 MW project will take at least three years to complete, assuming no delays.
This includes the time needed to build:
1) The installation of the turbines
2) The onshore infrastructure where the electricity will be delivered
3) The cabling from the wind turbines to shore
Timeline of Vineyard Wind Project. 
The project was first conceived in 2009 and the actual project development process began in June 2014, when BOEM allowed potential developers to start to bid on offshore leases.
The Vineyard Wind developers estimated the project would be commissioned at end 2023 or early 2024.
After a developer has secured an offshore lease, usually based on competitive bidding managed by BOEM, the developer submits a detailed COP.
The COP for Vineyard Wind was submitted on December 19, 2017. 
After a developer submits its COP, BOEM issues a notice of intent (NOI) to prepare a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS). 
For Vineyard Wind, BOEM issued the NOI on March 30, 2018.
The NOI allowed a 30-day public comment period, during which time BOEM held public meetings.
BOEM then issued its scoping report and began work on the DEIS.
BOEM published the Vineyard Wind DEIS on December 7, 2018. 
The DEIS was then subjected to public comment.
In the case of Vineyard Wind, based on those public comments, BOEM performed additional environmental analysis
BOEM issued a supplement to the DEIS for comments, in June 2020. 
BOEM issued the final EIS, in March 2021.
BOEM approved the Vineyard Wind COP in July 15, 2021. 
The final result was, the environmental review process took about three and a half years.
Fisheries and Migratory Species
As offshore wind projects multiply, there could be a bowl of spaghetti of cabling from the many wind projects. The cumulative environmental impacts of those projects, especially on commercial and sport fisheries and migratory species, and attendant litigation, would become an unmanageable, complex, time-consuming nightmare.
Law Suits: And even after BOEM approves a COP, litigation can delay a project.
Three lawsuits have been filed against Vineyard Wind, two of which allege harm to endangered whales. 
The third, filed by the Responsible Offshore Development Alliance (RODA), a coalition of fishing industry groups, alleges BOEM’s approval of the project “adds unacceptable risk” to the fishing industry. 
Whatever one thinks about the validity of such legal challenges, which are common for many types of energy infrastructure projects (e.g., pipelines, HV transmission lines, large solar systems), they can delay projects for many years.
An approved COP is just one component of the regulatory review process.
In addition to passing environmental muster, projects must secure siting approval from state energy and environmental regulators for onshore facilities and submit to a detailed review of how the HV grid must be modified to manage the electricity generated by the project.
If the grid requires extension/augmentation, such as new HV transmission lines, those must be approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC.
Even if lawsuits are quickly resolved, Vineyard Wind construction will not be completed until end 2024, at the earliest, 15 years after the project was proposed in 2009.
Increased Extension/Augmentation of HV Grid to Accommodate Random Wind Output
New Power plants cannot simply be “plugged into” the HV grid.
Instead, new power plants must undergo detailed system-impact studies, to ensure their output can be safely accommodated by the HV grid, without causing instability that could lead to forced outages.
The studies would also evaluate the reliability impacts of the project—that is, the likelihood a sudden outage of the facility or the interconnections, will cause a blackout.
Typically, extension/augmentation to the HV grid is required to accommodate additional generation.
ISO New England (ISO-NE) oversees the NE electric power system, and coordinates the operation of all generating plants. It has begun preparing a Cape Cod Resource Integration Study.
The first phase of that study evaluated the 800-MW Vineyard Wind and the 800-MW Mayflower Wind projects, both of which will be built southwest of Nantucket. 
The study determined, connecting the Mayflower Wind project will require a new 345-kilovolt (kV) substation at Bourne, Massachusetts, and a new 345-kV transmission line from West Barnstable, Massachusetts, to Bourne.
The estimated total cost for the HV grid extension/augmentation, JUST FOR THESE TWO PROJECTS, is $335 million, which will be charged to ratepayers, taxpayers, and government debt. 
Increased Standby/Backup Power Plant Capacity to Deal with Random Wind Output
Integrating the first 1,600 MW of offshore wind into the HV grid requires more than just building new transmission-system infrastructure.
Transmission-system planners must also determine the capacity, MW, of standby/backup power plants required to meet US government reliability standards. ,
The standby/backup plants can be:
1) Traditional power plants on hot and cold standby
2) Very expensive, grid-scale storage batteries
Wind power is unpredictable, variable and intermittent, I.e., unreliable, just like the wind.
Wind turbines cannot “load follow,” that is, vary their output up or down in response to instantaneous changes in electricity demand.
Maintaining a stable grid requires, on a less than minute-by-minute basis, 24/7/365:
1) Backup generation to counteract the ups and downs of wind output, to avoid instabilities
2) Filling in for any insufficiency of wind output, to meet user demand, including peak demand
Typically, this requires:
1) High-efficiency, up to 60%, combined-cycle, gas-turbine generators, operating at about 75% of rated output, to counteract the ups and downs of wind output
2) Traditional power plants on hot and cold standby
Hot standby means generators of power plants are spinning at 3600 rpm, in phase with grid frequency, but no power is fed to the HV grid
The amount of reserve capacity, called “Installed Reserve Margin” (IRM), required to integrate large quantities of variable, intermittent wind and solar generation is substantial.
The standby/backup plants have to staffed, fueled, kept in good working order, to instantly counteract the ups and downs of wind output, and provide electricity during wind lulls, which could last up to 5 to 7 days, and could be followed by a second multi-day wind lull, to provide electricity to the grid, as demanded by ISO-NE, to maintain continuous electricity service.
With increased buildouts of wind and solar, the quantities of electricity, MWh, to be counteracted increase, and more standby/backup plant capacity, MW, would be required, as experienced by the UK, Denmark, Germany, etc., all with high levels of wind (onshore and offshore) and solar on their grids; these countries also have the highest household electric rates electric in Europe. See URL
GRID-SCALE BATTERY SYSTEMS IN NEW ENGLAND TO COUNTERACT SHORTFALL OF ONE-DAY WIND/SOLAR LULL
HIGH COSTS OF WIND, SOLAR, AND BATTERY SYSTEMS IN US NORTHEAST
Zero-Emissions in New York State
New York State passed legislation in 2019 mandating a “zero-emissions” electric system by 2040.
According to the New York State Reliability Council (NYSRC), the projected peak electricity demand will be about 38,000 MW, in 2040.
That would require 50,000 MW of IRM (usually combined-cycle, gas-turbine plants, CCGTs) to maintain reliability.
Currently, New York State needs only 6,600 MW of IRM. 
The IRM would be 50000/38000 = 132%, in 2040, versus 20%, at present.
Owners of standby/backup plants will have to be compensated to stay in business.
This will significantly increase the wholesale cost/kWh
The cost of all this will not be not charged to Owners (to reinforce wind's "low-cost" mantra), but to already-struggling ratepayers and taxpayers.
NYSRC concluded, maintaining reliability would require:
1) “Substantial clean energy and dispatchable resources, some with yet to be developed technology (think expensive battery systems),
2) The capacity, MW, of all existing fossil fuel resources that are scheduled to be replaced/retired". 
NYSRC is a nonpartisan state agency, whose mission is to ensure New York’s electric power system provides state residents and businesses with adequate electricity supplies at all times.
Net-Zero and Electrify-Everything
As “Net-Zero and Electrify-Everything” mandates multiply, including for EVs and heat pumps and major appliances, ensuring reliable supplies of electricity will become critically important for the US economy.
If ensuring such reliability would require "yet-to-be-developed technologies", then US energy policy, including “Net-Zero and Electrify-Everything” mandates, would be completely divorced from reality, akin to “skating of thin ice in la-la-land”.
Folks, who likely never analyzed/designed/operated any energy systems, are claiming, without proof, enough battery storage can be deployed to ensure reliable electric supplies, 24/7/365.
They are living in a dreamworld consisting of their own Alice-in-Wonderland fantasies
Energy-and-resource-starved Europe has lots of those folks.
As Manhattan Institute fellow Mark Mills has shown, the quantities of raw materials needed for universal, grid-scale battery system deployment are staggering. 
BATTERY SYSTEM CAPITAL COSTS, OPERATING COSTS, ENERGY LOSSES, AND AGING
Realities of Offshore Wind Construction
Even if there were no legal challenges causing delays, actual construction of an offshore wind project and the transmission infrastructure (undersea cables, on-land substations, new high-voltage transmission lines) needed to deliver the electricity to the onshore electric grid is complex and time-consuming.
The projected construction period for Vineyard Wind is about three years. 
Installing the foundations is expected to take at least six months, and installing the turbines is expected to take at least one year.
That translates into about 18 months to install (62) 14-MW turbines, or about one turbine every nine days.
But numerous issues, affecting everything from manufacturing the turbines to installing them, are likely to cause project delays, especially as projects multiply.
Materials and Cost Issues
The promised surge in offshore wind development will run headlong into the reality of scarce resources.
The raw materials and rare metals needed for these projects are expensive and already in short supply.
Many PR folks, usually without any experience in analysis/design/operation of energy systems, ignore these issues,
They prefer issuing rosy press releases promising low installation costs, low electricity rates for households, etc.; "renewables cheaper than fossil", but that is true, only if high subsidies are provided
Those PR folks have jobs, because they are good at painting green economic nirvanas.
For example, a 2021 article in Nature Energy fantasizes, without proof, offshore wind costs will decrease by as much as half by 2050, based on nothing more than the opinions of unnamed “experts". 
A report from the rosy-glasses-wearing, National Renewable Energy Laboratory claims, without proof, the levelized cost  of offshore wind will decrease to $51/MWh by 2030. 
However, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), which has decades of intimate contacts with leading experts in the US energy sector, estimates the levelized cost of offshore wind facilities, entering service in 2026, at $115/MWh
NOTE: The $115/MWh likely is already too low, because of cost increases of materials, transport, energy labor, and general inflation.
NOTE: The $115/MWh does not include the levelized costs of: 1) greatly increased standby/backup plant capacity and O&M, and 2) onshore grid expansion/augmentation and O&M. 
Whereas, one may expect offshore wind developers to be cheerleaders for their projects, of much greater concern is many US policymakers refusing to recognize/deal with these issues.
Many are adopting a head-in-the sand approach toward them, lest they would be called deniers.
They attack those who raise the issues. 
But like the fable of “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” the technical and financial realities of offshore wind will make themselves known, regardless of how much proponents wish to hide, obfuscate and deny them.
Recent events in Europe exposed the inadequacies of the wind/solar/battery trio at warp speed, when winds were minimal, over large areas, during 2021; energy prices significantly increased well before the Ukraine events
Wind turbines, as well as solar panels and storage batteries, require rare-earth metals.
Most of the rare earths are sourced from China, which currently produces about 70% of global supplies. 
As the demand for rare earths increases, including for tens of millions of EVs per year, materials supply shortages, and high prices per metric ton, are likely, because of the limited sources for supplies. 
Currently, the US has little mining capacity for rare earths, except for a new mine in Hudspeth, Texas.
The Round Top Heavy Rare Earth, Lithium, and Critical Minerals Project—which is being developed by USA Rare Earths, is scheduled to open in 2023. 
The magnets wind turbines use to generate electricity contain rare earths.
There is only one manufacturer of these magnets in the United States.
It is located in North Carolina and produces about 2,400 tons of magnets annually.
Boosting wind energy production will require far greater supplies of magnets.
With the increase in demand and higher rare-earth prices per metric ton, offshore wind manufacturing costs will similarly increase.
Supplies for other key inputs, such as steel for offshore wind foundations and towers, are also in short supply; steel prices per metric ton have increased substantially. 
Although some of these shortages have been driven by the Covid-19 pandemic, and associated steel-mill shutdowns, post-COVID increases in demand for automobiles will push steel demand higher.
Thus, offshore wind projects will compete for scarce steel supplies, leading to project delays and higher costs.
Wind Turbine Size and Installation Complexity
The newest iteration of offshore wind turbines—which are slated to be used in many offshore wind projects, including Vineyard Wind—are rated at about 14 MW.
The only such turbine in operation today is a GE Haliade demonstration turbine located on dry land in Rotterdam, which started operation in 2019.
That GE turbine weighs about 825 metric tons and stand 850 feet tall—about three times taller than the Statue of Liberty. 
The Danish company Vestas announced in October 2021, it will install a 15-MW demonstration turbine in 2022, which will stand over 900 feet tall.
A German energy company, EnBW, may use this turbine in 2025 for its proposed 900-MW wind farm. 
There are designs for even larger wind turbines, rated at 20 MW or even 25 MW.
It is unlikely these larger turbines will be installed over the next decade, because the laws of physics present unavoidable and difficult scaling issues. 
The largest installed offshore turbines are rated at 10-MW, weighing about 500 tons.
Because, they weigh 825/500 = 60% more than GE Haliade, the installation process for the 14-MW GE turbines likely will be more complex and time-consuming, until installers gain sufficient experience.
WTIVs and the Jones Act
The installation process for these new turbines requires highly specialized and expensive ships— costing about $500 million each—called “wind turbine installation vessels” (WTIVS).
WTIVS share characteristics with so-called Jackup Rigs used for offshore oil drilling. 
Only 16 WTIVS are operating today.
By 2023, just seven WTIVS in the entire world will be capable of installing turbines as large as the new GE and Vestas ones.
However, those ships may not be permitted to install offshore wind turbines constructed in the US, because of a federal law, the Jones Act, that requires goods shipped between US ports to be transported on vessels that are built, owned, and operated by US citizens or permanent residents.
The only Jones Act–compliant WTIV will be the $500 million Charybdis, scheduled for completion by late 2023. 
Because the Jones Act applies only to goods shipped from US ports, the alternative would be to change the law, or to install offshore wind turbines that have been built abroad.
This would conflict with the administration’s promise of thousands of new domestic manufacturing and installation jobs.
Moreover, global competition for the use of those ships by offshore wind developers will be intense, especially as European countries continue to increase their offshore wind projects.
If anything, as the demand for these vessels increases, the cost to lease them is likely to increase, raising project costs.
In the North Sea, the success of offshore wind installation is due largely to the expertise of oil companies that have installed offshore platforms there.
And, while there is significant expertise in offshore oil rigs along the US Gulf Coast, there is no experience
off the US Atlantic and Pacific Coast.
Thus, not only will the supply of qualified personnel to operate WTIVS be constrained, but there will also be a learning curve associated with installing projects along the Atlantic Coast.
Undersea Cable Installation
Yet another challenge facing offshore wind developers is the installation of undersea cables that will deliver the electricity to mainland interconnections.
As the experience with the offshore cable for the BIW has demonstrated, improper burial of offshore cables is problematic.
If the cables are set too shallow, as with the BIW cable, they risk getting exposed by what is called “scour.” 
Exposed offshore cables are hazardous, because they can be snagged by trawling fishing nets, draglines or ship anchors.
Burying cables too deep risks overheating, which reduces the amount of electricity that can be transmitted. 
The first requirement for offshore cable projects is siting, which requires numerous studies, including:
1) Preliminary Route and Landing Site Assessment
2) Cable Burial Risk Assessment (CBRA)
3) Cable Burial Feasibility Assessment.
CBRA is especially important, as it determines the minimum recommended depth to avoid fisheries risks.
In addition, most projects will require the undersea cables to undergo a separate permitting process.
New York considers undersea cables operating at, or above, 125,000 volts, major transmission facilities, which are subject to a detailed siting process, known as an “Article VII”. 
Virtually all large offshore wind developments will require cables operating at even higher voltages. 
Cable Manufacturing and Installation
Lack of cable manufacturing capacity will delay offshore wind development.
Lead times of several years for new undersea cable are common. 
Under-capacity of cable manufacturing and installation is likely to increase as more offshore wind projects are developed, leading to project delays and higher costs. 
Offshore cables must be installed using special ships called Cable Lay Vessels.
The weight of offshore cables, about 240 tons per mile,  means that larger vessels are preferred; these vessels can carry longer lengths of cable, which means fewer cable segments and joints connecting them.
In Britain, the entire process for undersea cable planning and installation requires years of planning just to determine whether an offshore cable project is feasible and can be financed.
Final installation and testing can take two to three years. 
It is unlikely that the installation process in the US, which requires similar types of planning studies, detailed environmental review, and regulatory approvals, will be any faster.
The costs of inadequate cable siting and improper burial are substantial.
In Europe, the wind industry reports, about 70% of all project insurance claims are the result of cable manufacturing defects, installation issues, and damage from external forces.
Increasing competition in offshore wind has led to cost-cutting at the expense of quality control, and this is leading to more insurance claims.
More cable breakdowns mean less electricity generation, which will further increase the costs of ensuring reliability, and costs per kWh
Pursuing the Offshore Wind Fantasy Will Impose Significant Costs, but Yield Few, if Any, Benefits
In 2020, total utility-scale electric generating capacity in the US was over 1.1 million MW.
Of that total, almost half, about 486,000 MW, was natural gas-fired generation.
Another 215,000 MW was coal-fired generation.
By 2050, EIA projects, total US generating capacity will be about 1.7 million MW, a more than a 50% increase over current levels.
While EIA projects, coal-fired generation will decrease to just 125,000 MW by 2050, that is still four times the 30,000 MW of offshore wind by 2030.
The single largest increase will be natural gas-fired generation, which EIA projects at about 300,000 MW by 2050.
If it were physically achievable, the addition of 30,000 MW of offshore wind by 2030 would represent a tiny fraction of total electricity fed to US grids
The 78-million-ton purported annual reductions in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions claimed by the administration represents less than 2% of total US CO2 emissions in 2020, and less than one day’s worth of world CO2 emissions. 
If the administration’s emissions reduction figure is accurate, it would have no measurable impact on climate change, especially as nations, such as China and India, which account for 45% of world CO2 emissions,  continue to increase their consumption of fossil fuels, including coal.
In addition, the costs of: 1) offshore wind generation, 2) standby/backup plants, 3) grid extension/augmentation, will make ALL electricity much less affordable, especially in the Atlantic Coast states, where most of the offshore wind capacity would be located.
Combined with “Net-Zero and Electrify-Everything” mandates, including millions of heat pumps and EVs, the result would be to force millions of consumers and businesses to spend far more to meet their energy needs, which is bad for the international competitiveness of New England and US businesses.
The resulting adverse economic impacts of these higher electricity costs—reduced spending available for investment and purchases of other goods and services—will reduce economic growth.
Such reductions are almost certain to exceed the "promised economic gains” from massive subsidies for offshore wind.
Robbing Peter to pay benefits/subsidies to Paul, that will financially harm/ruin Peter, is not a good idea
It is impossible for a nation to subsidize/inflate its way to greater economic growth and prosperity, despite rosy pronouncements by self-serving politicians and their cohorts.
Subsidies transfer expensive/scarce capital from higher-value purposes supported by market forces, to lower-value purposes, that require subsidies to exist.
Otherwise, why would the wind/solar/batteries trio need decades of subsidies?
That is exactly the case for onshore/offshore wind
The federal government and Atlantic Coast states are offering massive subsidies to offshore wind developers, to implement the rosy fantasies of politicians and their cohorts.
Increased Subsidy Bonanza for Offshore Wind
Increasing subsidies and mandates for wind and solar will undermine the competitive pricing in the wholesale electricity markets
Unfortunately, it is doubtful whether the basic economic and physical realities of the offshore wind goal discussed in this report will change proponents’ minds.
There are several reasons for this:
1) One group of offshore wind proponents are surely well aware of the physical limitations that will prevent achievement of the 30,000-MW goal.
Nevertheless, they stand to reap huge financial gains from the projects that are built.
They may believe that addressing climate change is important, but their primary interest is exploiting $green energy mandates for their own financial gain.
In early 2021, the administration increased the financial benefits project developers and financiers can obtain.
Specifically, offshore wind projects will be able to collect both a production tax credit (PTC), currently about $24/MWh, plus a 30% investment tax credit (ITC). 
Previously, developers could collect one subsidy or the other, but not both.
Such high subsidies would pay more than 60% of the levelized costs of the offshore wind projects; a bonanza for the wealthy foreign and domestic folks seeking tax shelters!!
For example, the Danish and Spanish developers of Vineyard Wind will be able to recover an estimated $1.4 billion from US taxpayers, because of their eligibility to recover the ITC. 
Whereas, the "inflation Reduction Act" subsidies are about $370 BILLION, the easy money is far higher. There is about $1 TRILLION of tax measures and related lending incentives, such as loan guarantees, to support: 1) energy security and 2) a faster rollout of renewables from all program.
All costs will be charged to taxpayers and ratepayers and added to government debt
2) A second group of offshore wind proponents may be characterized as “true believers.”
For them, there is a looming "climate catastrophe". 
Preventing that "climate catastrophe" is more important than any other societal value, be it democracy, free speech, or existing laws.
This group believes preventing climate change requires massive investments in $green energy, eliminating all fossil fuel consumption, and other draconian changes to society, such as eating bugs, instead of meat.
For this group, the extensive environmental damage caused by the mining and processing of rare-earth minerals,  , or the child and slave labor used to mine cobalt in the Congo, is irrelevant, as long as the PLANET is saved. 
Similarly irrelevant are concerns about adverse impacts on fisheries and endangered flora and fauna, as well as higher energy costs and their impacts on the poor.
This group of eco-fanatics is beyond redemption.
This group is incapable to evaluate tradeoffs and engage in rational arguments.
Battery Systems for ONE HOUR Backup of US Electric System
Hourly electricity loaded by power plants onto US HV grid
4000 billion kWh x 1/8766 = 456,308,465 kWh, as AC
Batteries should not be discharged to less than 20% full and not be charged to more than 80% full, to achieve 15-y useful service life, per Tesla.
Battery system rated capacity
456308465 kWh x 1/0.6, available capacity x 1/0.93 Tesla design factor = 817,757,105 kWh, delivered as AC at battery voltage
All-in Turnkey Capital Cost
817757105 kWh x $500/kWh/1000000000 = $409 billion; most of it would need to be replaced about every 15 years. See Note
Li-ion battery systems have a loss of about 18%, when new, and about 20%, when older, AC from HV grid to AC to HV grid basis.
1) Delivered to HV grid is 456,308,465 kWh, as AC
2) Charge decrease of battery system is 456308465/0.9 = 507,009,405 kWh, as DC; a 10% loss
3) Drawn from HV grid is 507009405/0.9 = 563,343,783 kWh, as AC; a 10% loss
4) The loss, 3 minus 4, has to be made up by wind and solar, and other power plants
NOTE: Hourly electricity generated by Biden's 30,000 MW of offshore wind turbines would be
30,000 MW x 1 h x 0.45, annual capacity factor = 13,500,000 kWh, which would be 100 x 13500000/456308465 = 2.96% of hourly electricity fed to US grid
NOTE: The rated capacity of the Moss Landing, California, battery system, owned by Pacific Gas and Electric Company, is 300 MW/1200 MWh.
The all-in, turnkey, capital cost was $370 million, or $370 million/1200000 kWh = $308/kWh, delivered as AC at battery voltage; 2018 pricing
The $308/kWh in 2018 has increased at least 50% to $462/kWh in 2022, with higher pricing after 2022.
NOTE: The EIA estimates, US battery storage capacity will increase from 9.1 GW at end 2022 to 30 GW at end 2025. See URL
If these were 4-h batteries, the battery rating would be 30 GW/120 GWh, i.e., provide 30,000 MW of power for 4 hours.
The operating power capacity would be 30 GW x 0.6 = 18 GW
The operating energy storage capacity would be 120 GWh x 0.6 = 72 GWh