More Focus On The Impossible Costs Of A Fully Wind/Solar/Battery Energy System
February 01, 2022/ Francis Menton
It should be glaringly obvious that, if we are shortly going to try to convert to a “net zero” carbon emissions energy system based entirely on wind, sun and batteries, then there needs to be serious focus on the feasibility and costs of such a system.
The particular part of such a prospective system that needs the most focus is the method of energy storage, its cost and, indeed, feasibility. That part needs focus because, as wind and solar increase their share of generation over 50% of the total, storage becomes far and away the dominant driver of the total costs.
Moreover, there is no clear way to identify some fixed amount of storage that will be sufficient to make such a system reliable enough to power a modern economy without full backup from dispatchable sources. This also should be glaringly obvious to anyone who thinks about the problem for any amount of time.
And yet, as recently as a couple of weeks ago, it seemed like the entire Western world was racing forward to “net zero” based on wind and sun without anyone anywhere giving real thought to the problem of the amount of storage needed, let alone its cost, and let alone whether any fixed amount of storage could ever fully assure complete reliability.
A retired, independent guy named Roger Andrews had done some calculations back in 2018 for test cases of California and Germany, which had showed that at least 30 days’ of storage would be needed to back up a fully wind/solar system.
Andrews’s work showed that storage costs just to be sufficient to match actual wind/solar intermittency patterns for 2017 would likely cause a multiplication of the cost of electricity by something in the range of a factor of 14 to 22.
But Andrews did not even get to the point of considering how much storage might be needed in worst case scenarios of lengthy winter wind or sun droughts.
And then Andrews died suddenly in early 2019, and nobody immediately took up where he left off.
But then a few weeks ago I discovered at Watts Up With That some new work from someone named Ken Gregory (again, a retired, independent guy — funny, isn’t it?), who produced a spreadsheet for the entire United States again showing that about 30 days’ storage would be needed to back up a fully wind/solar system. (Cost for the storage, assuming all energy use gets electrified: about $400 trillion.)
And now, some others are getting into the act. And none too soon. A guy named Roger Caiazza has a blog called Pragmatic Environmentalist of New York. Caiazza, as you might by now have guessed, is another independent retired guy.
In the past few months, he has turned his attention principally to the energy transition supposedly getting underway here in New York State, as a result of something called the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act of 2019 (the Climate Act).
The Climate Act created a gaggle of bureaucracies, and the end of 2021 saw those bureaucracies utter something they call the “Scoping Plan,” laying out how New York is going to go from its current energy system to the nirvana of electrification of everything together with “net zero” emissions by no later than 2050.
The Scoping Plan is a massive document (some 330 pages plus another 500+ pages of appendices) of breathtaking incompetence. The basic approach, summarized by me in this post of December 29, 2021, is that designated “expert” bureaucrats working for the State, themselves having no actual idea how to achieve “net zero” from an engineering perspective, will get around that problem by simply ordering the people to achieve the “net zero” goal by a date certain.
Then, presumably some engineers will magically emerge to work out the details. The thousands of people who put this thing together apparently do not regard proof of cost, or feasibility, as any part of their job.
As to the key problem of energy storage to achieve “net zero” goals, the Scoping Plan, in nearly 1000 pages of heft, never even gets to the point of recognizing that the MWh (as opposed to MW) is the key unit that must be considered to assess issues of cost and feasibility.
For the past many weeks, Caiazza has been putting out one post after another ripping the Climate Act and the “Scoping Plan” apart, piece by piece.
But for today, I want to focus on one post from January 24 titled “Scoping Plan Reliability Feasibility – Renewable Variability.” This post considers the implications of dependence only on wind and solar power, particularly as to how much storage would be needed with such a system, and without remaining fossil fuel backup, to achieve necessary system reliability.
Rather than creating a spreadsheet for annual wind and solar generation, in the manner of Andrews or Gregory, Caiazza takes a different approach, which is simply to consider a worst-case scenario. (For this purpose Caiazza draws on a January 20 piece from a guy named David Wojick at PA Pundits International.).
The beauty of considering the worst-case scenario is that the math becomes so simple you can do it in your head.
So here is the scenario considered by Caiazza. Your mission as the State is to deliver 1000 MW of power continuously with complete reliability, but with only the wind and sun to provide the generation.
How much generation capacity do you need, and how much storage do you need? And how much will it cost? (New York’s average current usage is about 18,000 MW, and by the time everything is electrified that will be at least 60,000 MW, so we can multiply everything by 60 at the end to see what the cost implications are for the State of New York.)
First what is the hypothesized worst case? To make the math simple, Caiazza hypothesizes a solar/storage only system, and a five day winter period of overcast, followed by two sunny days to recharge, before the next such worst-case 5-day sun drought.
The required battery capacity is simple. Five days at 24 hours a day is 120 hours. To supply a steady 1,000 MW that is a whopping 120,000 MWh of storage.
We already have the overnight storage capacity for 16 hours so we now need an additional 104 hours, which means 104,000 MWh of additional storage.
But the 120,000 MWh of storage assumes that you charge the batteries up to 100% and discharge them down to 0%.
Real world batteries are supposed to only range between about 20% and 80% charge for best performance.
The standard practice is to operate between 80% and 20%. In that case the available storage is just 60% of the nameplate capacity. This turns the dark days 120,000 MWh into a requirement for 200,000 MWh.
I might throw in that solar panels don’t produce at full capacity for anything close to 8 hours on even the sunniest winter day, but who’s quibbling?
Now suppose that in this worst-case scenario we only had two days to charge up since the last 5 day drought:
Two days gives us 16 hours of charging time for the needed 120,000 MWh, which requires a large 7,500 MW of generating capacity. We already have 3,000 MW of generating capacity but that is in use providing round the clock sunny day power. It is not available to help recharge the dark days batteries. Turns out we need a whopping 10,500 MW of solar generating capacity.
That’s right, it’s not just that you need 200,000 MWh of storage, but you also need more than ten times the “capacity” of solar panels as the mere 1000 MW that you are trying to deliver on a firm basis, just to deal with this worst case scenario to deliver 1000 MW firm through one bad month in the winter.
For cost of storage, Caiazza takes what he calls a standard EIA figure of $250/MWh for the batteries. At this price, 200,000 MWh would cost $50 billion.
Then there is the cost of the solar panels.
Here, Caiazza has a standard EIA figure of $1.3 million per MW. For the 10,500 MW capacity case, that would mean $13.7 billion. Add the $50 billion plus the $13.7 billion and you get $63.7 billion.
And that’s for the 1000 MW firm power case.
Remember, fully-electrified New York State is going to need 60,000 MW firm. So multiply the $63.7 billion by 60, and you get $3.822 trillion.
For comparison, the annual GDP of New York State is approximately $1.75 trillion.
Caiazza points out that the state’s Scoping Plan gives necessary storage costs for the new wind/solar/battery system in the range of $288.6 to $310.5 billion.
These figures are about 10 times lower than we just calculated.
But Caiazza attempts to find in the Scoping Plan the assumptions on which these numbers were calculated, and he can’t find it. Neither can I. Maybe some reader can take a crack.
The reader may find that Caiazza’s $3.8 trillion figure for New York State seems remarkably small relative to the number calculated by Gregory.
Gregory got about $400 trillion for the U.S. as a whole.
New York representing about 7% of the U.S. economy, that would mean that the cost of the storage piece for New York would be closer to $30 trillion than $4 trillion.
The difference is that Caiazza is calculating the cost of just getting through one “worst case” week in the winter, while Gregory considers the cost of trying to get through a whole year where energy needs to be stored up from the summer to get through the whole winter.
One final point.
Suppose that, based on even a few decades of meteorological data, you determine that this five day winter sun drought is the true worst case scenario, and you put together a system on that basis.
OK, what now happens when one year you get a six-day drought?
By hypothesis your fossil fuel backup has been dismantled and is no longer available.
Does all power then just go out on that sixth day?
Remember, this is the dead of winter.
People are going to freeze to death.
So are you going to keep the fossil fuel backup around just for this one day that might occur only once every few decades?
If so, how much of the fossil fuel backup capacity do you need to keep?
Think about that for a second.
The answer is, all of it.
In the 60,000 MW firm power requirement scenario for New York State, you will need 60,000 MW of available fossil fuel capacity to cover that one day when the batteries run out.
Dozens of major power plants, fully maintained, staffed, fueled, in good working order, capable of being turned on for this one emergency day perhaps once every twenty years.
Or you can try to avoid that by building yet more solar panels and more batteries so that you can get through a six-day sun drought.
But what happens when you get a drought of seven days?
It’s almost impossible to contemplate the lack of critical thinking that is going into this so-called green energy transition.
Comment
Many others have done the calculation. See http://vandyke.mynetgear.com/Nuclear.html and http://vandyke.mynetgear.com/Worse.html. My calculations for California using five years of CISO data are 3,000 Wh/W.
One week doesn't begin to cover it. In 1815, Mount Tambora exploded, sending several thousand cubic kilometers of ash into the stratosphere, giving us "the year without a summer." That WILL happen again. Having a week of storage will mean having 51 weeks with no electricity.
Don't ignore the increased vulnerability to electromagnetic pulse posed by thousands of miles of new wiring. Nefarious actors aren't the only EMP worry. The sun belches out several trillion cubic kilometers of intensely hot plasma every eleven years, and it hits the Earth about every sixty years. The last time, aurora were seen in Cuba. We're due for that any day now.
EXCERPT from:
BIDEN 30,000 MW OFFSHORE WIND SYSTEMS BY 2030; AN EXPENSIVE FANTASY
https://www.windtaskforce.org/profiles/blogs/biden-30-000-mw-of-off...
APPENDIX 1
Turnkey Capital Costs of Grid-scale Battery Systems
Articles often assume turnkey capital cost of battery systems at $350/kWh, delivered as AC (which needs to be stepped up to distribution or high voltage system voltage, about a 1% loss)
That value would be about $500/kWh, based on five annual EIA surveys of cost trends
Here are the annual EIA reports for 2020 and 2021
Starting in 2015, EIA has prepared annual reports regarding site-specific, custom-designed, grid-scale battery systems.
The average duration of deliverable electricity increased from 0.5 h in 2015 to 3.2 h in 2019.
Excluded are:
1) Financing costs
2) Benefits of subsidies, such as grants, tax credits, accelerated depreciation, loan interest deductions, waiving of state and local taxes, fees and surcharges, etc.
3) System aging/degradation costs, because the systems had been in operation only a few years.
EIA 2020 Report
The EIA graph, based on surveys of battery system users, shows slowly decreasing costs after 2018
It appears, the range of values likely would become $900/kWh to 450/kWh in 2025.
The values would be near the high end of the range in New England.
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=45596
The US average turnkey capital cost of battery systems was about $590/kWh, delivered as AC, in 2019.
The NE average turnkey capital cost for such systems is about $700/kWh, delivered as AC, in 2019
Those prices will not decrease much for at least the next 5 to 10 years, per US EIA, unless major technical breakthroughs are discovered, and subsequently implemented on a large scale. See URL
EIA 2021 Report
Table 6 combines the data of prior reports and the 2021 report. See table 6 and page 18 of URLs
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/electricity/batterystorage/pdf...
https://www.windtaskforce.org/profiles/blogs/economics-of-utility-s...
Such battery systems operate 8766 hours per year
About 65% of capacity, from 15% full to 80% full, can be used to achieve 15-year lives
Annual capacity factor is about 0.5, i.e., a working throughput of about 50% of rated throughput
NOTE: Such battery systems are entirely different from the battery packs in electric cars, which operate about 700 hours per year, last about 8 years, and cost about $10,000 for a 60-kWh battery, or $165/kWh.
That cost may become $125/kWh with more mass production in future years.
NOTE: Various financial services entities, such as Bloomberg and Lazard, issue reports that project lower battery system costs/kWh, delivered as AC, than the EIA, likely to hype their financial services business interests. It would be prudent to ignore those reports.
Table 6/Battery system turnkey cost |
Range |
Duration |
Average |
Year |
$/kWh as AC |
hour |
$/kWh as AC |
2015 |
2500 to 1750 |
0.5 |
2102 |
2016 |
2800 to 750 |
1.5 |
1417 |
2017 |
1500 to 700 |
1.8 |
755 |
2018 |
1250 to 500 |
2.4 |
625 |
2019 |
1050 to 475 |
3.2 |
589 |
2025 |
900 to 450 |
|
500 |
APPENDIX 2
Energy Losses of Grid-Scale Battery Systems
Articles often assume a battery loss of 10%, which likely would be only the battery.
That loss should have been assumed at about 20%, on a-to-z basis.
See Note.
Here are two sources:
Source 1 is based on measured data, on a-to-z basis
This article identifies 18 losses of a stationary battery system, totaling about 20% for a round-trip, excluding transformer losses.
See Note.
- The system model has four coupled, component models: 1) Battery, 2) Power Electronics, 3) Thermal Management, such as heating/cooling of batteries and enclosures, and 4) Control and Monitoring.
- Electricity for site lighting, O&M, surveillance, etc.
Open URL and click on “View Open Manuscript”
See figures 3, 4 and 17 of article.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306261917315696
Source 2 is based on EIA survey data from OPERATING grid-scale battery systems
Per EIA survey, grid-scale battery efficiency is about 80%, AC-to-AC basis, excluding step-down and step-up transformer losses.
Aging had only a minor effect, because the battery systems were only a few years old.
See Note.
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=46756
Sequence of Losses:
1) AC electricity from a distribution, or high-voltage grid, via a step-down transformer, about a 1% loss, to reduce the voltage to that of the battery
2) Through the power electronics to DC
3) In battery
4) Out battery
5) Through power electronics; DC is digitized, made into a sine wave with same phase and 60-cycle frequency as the grid
6) Via a step-up transformer, about a 1% loss, to the distribution, or high-voltage grid
Overall efficiency of about 78%, less with aging at about 1.5%/y. See URL
https://www.explainthatstuff.com/how-inverters-work.html
APPENDIX 3
Cost Shifting from Owners to Ratepayers and Taxpayers
The owning and operating cost of wind, solar and battery systems, c/kWh, is reduced by about 45%, due to subsidies. However, because no cost ever disappears, per Economics 101, the subsidy costs are “socialized”, i.e., added, in one way or another, onto:
1) Rate bases of utilities, i.e., paid by ratepayers
2) Taxpayers, by means of extra taxes, fees and surcharges on electric bills and fuel bills
3) Government budgets
4) Government debt
5) Prices of goods and services, other than electricity
If the subsidies had to be paid by Owners of wind and solar systems, the contract prices paid to Owners would need to be:
- At least 19.3 c/kWh, instead of 11 c/kWh, for large-scale solar
- At least 15.5 c/kWh, instead of 9 c/kWh, for ridge line wind. See table 1 and URL
http://www.windtaskforce.org/profiles/blogs/cost-shifting-is-the-na...
Shifting Grid Costs
Many small-scale solar systems and/or a few large-scale solar systems on a distribution grid would excessively disturb the grid, especially at midday. Battery systems could counteract those output variations.
Wind and solar systems could not be connected to any grid without the peaking, filling-in and counteracting services of the CCGT plants, i.e., shutting down CCGT plants, and artificially diminishing/obstructing their gas supply, advocated by pro RE folks, would not be an option for decades, if ever, because of the high costs of site-specific, custom-designed, utility-grade, grid-scale battery systems.
Costs not paid by wind/solar Owners:
- The cost of extension/augmentation of electric grids to connect widely distributed wind and solar systems
- The cost of services rendered by other generators, mostly CCGT plants, which counteract the variable, intermittent outputs of wind and solar, 24/7/365
- The cost of battery systems to stabilize distribution grids, due to variations of the solar and wind system outputs
Shifting Owning and Operating Costs
The combined effect of cost shifting, determined behind closed doors, increases a project’s annual cash flow, i.e., “left-over-money”, to provide an ample profit for the RE system Owner.
RE system Owners are happy, having the “ears” of friendly politicians, saving the world from climate change, and claiming: “See, my project is profitable and competitive”, while everyone else gets hosed.
1) Grants from various sources, such as the VT Clean Energy Development Fund
2) 26% federal investment tax credits, plus state FITs. Tax credits reduce, dollar-for-dollar, the taxes GMP pays on profits
3) 100% depreciation over 5 years; the normal for utilities is 20 to 25 years. Write-offs reduce GMP taxable income
4) Deductions of interest on borrowed money. Interest deductions reduce GMP taxable income.
5) Various O&M payments are often waved, such as sales tax, fees, property tax, school tax, municipal tax, etc.
6) RE system Owners sell their output at two to four times NE wholesale rates
APPENDIX 4
“All-in” Electricity Cost of Wind and Solar in New England
https://www.windtaskforce.org/profiles/blogs/high-costs-of-wind-sol...
http://www.windtaskforce.org/profiles/blogs/cost-shifting-is-the-na...
Pro RE folks point to the “price paid to owner” as the cost of wind and solar, purposely ignoring the other cost categories. The all-in cost of wind and solar, c/kWh, includes:
1) Above-market-price paid to Owners
2) Subsidies paid to Owners
3) Owner return on invested capital at about 9%/y
4) Grid extension/augmentation
5) Grid support services, including fees for:
- Capacity availability (i.e., plants are fueled, staffed, kept in good working order, ready to produce on short notice)
- More frequent plant start-up/shut-down
6) Future battery systems
Comments on table 1
- Vermont legacy Standard Offer solar systems had greater subsidies paid to owner, than newer systems
- Wind prices paid to owner did not have the drastic reductions as solar prices.
- Vermont utilities are paid about 3.5 c/kWh for various costs they incur regarding net-metered solar systems
- "Added to rate base" is the cost wind and solar are added to the utility rate base, used to set electric rates.
- “Total cost”, including subsidies to owner and grid support, is the cost at which wind/solar are added to the utility rate base
- “NE utility cost” is the annual average cost of purchased electricity, about 6 c/kWh, plus NE grid operator charges, about 1.6 c/kWh
for a total of 7.6 c/kWh.
- “Grid support costs” would increase with increased use of battery systems to counteract the variability and intermittency of increased build-outs of wind and solar systems.
NOTES:
1) NE wholesale grid price averaged about 5 c/kWh, starting in 2009, due to low-cost CCGT and nuclear plants providing at least 65% of all electricity loaded onto the NE grid, in 2019.
https://www.iso-ne.com/about/key-stats/resource-mix/
https://nepool.com/uploads/NPC_20200305_Composite4.pdf
2) There are Owning costs, and Operating and Maintenance costs, of the NE grid
ISO-NE charges these costs to utilities at about 1.6 c/kWh. The ISO-NE charges include:
Regional network services, RNS, based on the utility peak demand occurring during a month
Forward capacity market, FCM, based on the utility peak demand occurring during a year.
Table 1/VT & NE sources |
Paid to |
Subsidy |
Grid |
GMP |
Added |
ISO-NE |
Total |
NE |
Times |
|
|
paid to |
support |
|
to rate |
RNS+ |
|
utility |
|
owner |
towner |
cost |
adder |
base |
FCM |
cost |
cost |
||
c/kWh |
c/kWh |
c/kWh |
c/kWh |
c/kWh |
c/kWh |
c/kWh |
c/kWh |
||
Solar, rooftop, net-metered, new |
17.4 |
5.2 |
2.1 |
3.5 |
20.9 |
1.6 |
29.8 |
7.6 |
3.92 |
Solar, rooftop, net-metered, legacy |
18.2 |
5.4 |
2.1 |
3.5 |
21.7 |
1.6 |
30.8 |
7.6 |
4.05 |
Solar, standard offer, combo |
11.0 |
6.74 |
2.1 |
11.0 |
1.6 |
21.44 |
7.6 |
2.82 |
|
Solar, standard offer, legacy |
21.7 |
10.5 |
2.1 |
21.7 |
1.6 |
35.9 |
7.6 |
4.72 |
|
Wind, ridge line, new |
8.5 |
3.9 |
2.4 |
8.5 |
1.6 |
16.4 |
7.6 |
2.15 |
|
Wind, offshore, new |
9.0 |
4.1 |
2.4 |
9.0 |
1.6 |
17.1 |
7.6 |
2.25 |
Sample calculation; NE utility cost = 6, Purchased + 1.6, (RNS + FCM) = 7.6 c/kWh
Sample calculation; added to utility base = 17.4 + 3.5 = 20.9 c/kWh
Sample calculation; total cost = 17.4 + 5.2 + 2.1 + 3.5 + 1.6 = 29.8 c/kWh
Excludes costs for very expensive battery systems
Excludes costs for very expensive floating, offshore wind systems
Excludes cost for dealing with shortfalls during multi-day wind/solar lulls. See URL
https://www.windtaskforce.org/profiles/blogs/wind-and-solar-provide...
“Added to rate base” is for recent 20-y electricity supply contracts awarded by competitive bidding in NE.
“Added to rate base” would be much higher without subsidies and cost shifting.
US regions with good wind and solar conditions, and low construction costs/kW, produce at low c/kWh.
NE has poor wind conditions, except on pristine ridge lines, and the poorest solar conditions in the US, except the rainy, Seattle area.
NE has highest on-shore, ridgeline construction costs/kW ($2,400/kW in 2020), produces at high c/kWh
See page 39 of URL
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-08/Land-Based%20Win...
U.S. Sen Angus King
Maine as Third World Country:
CMP Transmission Rate Skyrockets 19.6% Due to Wind Power
Click here to read how the Maine ratepayer has been sold down the river by the Angus King cabal.
Maine Center For Public Interest Reporting – Three Part Series: A CRITICAL LOOK AT MAINE’S WIND ACT
******** IF LINKS BELOW DON'T WORK, GOOGLE THEM*********
(excerpts) From Part 1 – On Maine’s Wind Law “Once the committee passed the wind energy bill on to the full House and Senate, lawmakers there didn’t even debate it. They passed it unanimously and with no discussion. House Majority Leader Hannah Pingree, a Democrat from North Haven, says legislators probably didn’t know how many turbines would be constructed in Maine if the law’s goals were met." . – Maine Center for Public Interest Reporting, August 2010 https://www.pinetreewatchdog.org/wind-power-bandwagon-hits-bumps-in-the-road-3/From Part 2 – On Wind and Oil Yet using wind energy doesn’t lower dependence on imported foreign oil. That’s because the majority of imported oil in Maine is used for heating and transportation. And switching our dependence from foreign oil to Maine-produced electricity isn’t likely to happen very soon, says Bartlett. “Right now, people can’t switch to electric cars and heating – if they did, we’d be in trouble.” So was one of the fundamental premises of the task force false, or at least misleading?" https://www.pinetreewatchdog.org/wind-swept-task-force-set-the-rules/From Part 3 – On Wind-Required New Transmission Lines Finally, the building of enormous, high-voltage transmission lines that the regional electricity system operator says are required to move substantial amounts of wind power to markets south of Maine was never even discussed by the task force – an omission that Mills said will come to haunt the state.“If you try to put 2,500 or 3,000 megawatts in northern or eastern Maine – oh, my god, try to build the transmission!” said Mills. “It’s not just the towers, it’s the lines – that’s when I begin to think that the goal is a little farfetched.” https://www.pinetreewatchdog.org/flaws-in-bill-like-skating-with-dull-skates/
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Hannah Pingree - Director of Maine's Office of Innovation and the Future
"Once the committee passed the wind energy bill on to the full House and Senate, lawmakers there didn’t even debate it. They passed it unanimously and with no discussion. House Majority Leader Hannah Pingree, a Democrat from North Haven, says legislators probably didn’t know how many turbines would be constructed in Maine."
https://pinetreewatch.org/wind-power-bandwagon-hits-bumps-in-the-road-3/
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